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 “I cannot believe that this world body, the United Nations, could stand by, calmly 
watching what I submit is genocide masquerading under the guise of a civilised dispensation of 
justice.” - Oliver Tambo, exiled President of the African National Congress in an October 8, 1963 
speech to the United Nations’ Special Political Committee of the General Assembly1 
Introduction 
For over fifty years, South Africa’s apartheid government held state power. Its 
state sanctioned violence represented an anomaly in the post-war liberalism of the second 
half of 20th century. The state that aided in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
would be charged with the two of the most notable episodes of racially targeted violence. 
Two pivotal events, the Sharpeville Massacre in 1960 and the Soweto Uprising in1976, 
respectively, altered the course of United States-South African relations. Both the 
Sharpeville Massacre and the Soweto Uprising demonstrate the United States and the 
United Nations failure to respond effectively to the public outrages of the apartheid 
regime. After Sharpeville, US Presidents Dwight Eisenhower and John F. Kennedy failed 
to establish a consistent foreign policy in opposition to the apartheid regime that was not 
influenced by Cold War politics. The Eisenhower administration actually deepened 
military ties. Even in the UN, the US stifled attempts by the African-Asian bloc to check 
the apartheid state to preserve its Cold War alliance. In the aftermath of the Soweto 
Uprising, US Presidents Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter would utilize similar political 
rhetoric and take no real action towards the apartheid regime. Conversely, by establishing 
Special Committee on the Policies of Apartheid of the Government of the Republic of 
                                                 
1 Oliver Tambo, “Appeal for Action to Stop Repression and Trials in South Africa” (1963), in Oliver 
Tambo: Apartheid and the International Community, ed. E.S. Reddy (New Delhi: Namibia Foundation 
Sterling Publishers Private Limited, 1991).  
  
 
 
South Africa, the UN took action against the Pretoria regime.2 The US foreign policy 
response to the apartheid regime conforms to the Cold War policy of supporting white 
capitalism over black liberation. However, the rise of these same black liberation 
movements within the US and South Africa eventually forced substantive change. A US 
foreign policy focused on Cold War diplomacy and lack of a significant international 
pressure by Western States on the apartheid regime encouraged the growth of South 
African resistance both in the US and South Africa.   
Chapter 1: Literature Review 
 This chapter introduces central ideas that surround the Sharpeville Massacre and 
the Soweto Uprising as well as incorporates the official US and UN position. The works 
that informed the background information of this project provide the clearest 
historiographical understanding of Sharpeville, Soweto, and US and UN reactions. The 
apartheid government of South Africa was a controversial foreign policy consideration 
that ten United States Presidents had to address. Each did so differently, and the 1960 
Sharpeville Massacre and the 1976 Soweto Uprising marked shifts, either minute and 
latent or immediate and overt, in foreign policy towards the Pretoria regime. Cold War 
politics, the American Civil Rights Movement, UN pressure, and armed resistance in 
South Africa contributed to how apartheid and US governments interacted with one 
another. The spatial location of Sharpeville in American politics allowed the Eisenhower 
and Kennedy administrations to create superficial reprimands, thereby engendering an 
internal South African resistance. Soweto exposed further gaps in US foreign policy 
                                                 
2 The Pretoria regime refers to the apartheid South African government and the Nationalist Party. These 
terms will be used interchangeably.   
  
 
 
despite the success of the American Civil Rights Movements and growing international 
attention to South Africa’ human rights abuses. The existing literature provides 
individualized responses to US-South African relations rather than a cohesive 
comparative analysis of the two infamous events.  
 The common trend of comparing American and South African race experiences 
was a critical element of anti-apartheid movements. Nicholas Grant notes the impact of 
Little Rock on Eisenhower’s handling of apartheid and the indirect effect it had on the 
Pretoria regime’s theoretical defense of apartheid on the international stage.3 Pretoria 
watched as the US fumbled the international reaction to Little Rock in 1957 and used it as 
a lesson to prepare for the impending day when racial supremacy was not an acceptable 
policy. One critical lesson Pretoria learned was the ability to twist the UN’s foundational 
principle of self-determination and state sovereignty as a protection from international 
scrutiny.4 Grant builds upon Cary Fraser’s earlier arguments that Eisenhower was 
sensitive to aligning with South Africa because their race relations made them a liability 
in the emerging American Civil Rights Movement.5 Grant then concludes that 
Sharpeville’s high publicity on the international stage demonstrated a similar Little Rock 
situation that did not sit well with the majority of Americans.6 This analysis of 1950’s 
US-South Africa relations informs readers of Eisenhower’s reaction towards the 
apartheid government in the aftermath of Sharpeville as the US and South Africa 
struggled to handle domestic race relations with international criticism looming.  
                                                 
3 Nicholas Grant, Winning Our Freedom Together: African Americans and Apartheid, 1945-1960 (USA: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2017): 58-62. 
4 Ibid., 60. 
5 Cary Fraser, “Crossing the Color Line in Little Rock: The Eisenhower Administration and the Dilemma 
of Race for US Foreign Policy,” Diplomatic History 24, no. 2 (2000), 240.  
6 Grant, 61.  
  
 
 
Existing literature fails to focus on a comparative analysis of the Sharpeville and 
Soweto incidents, yet each provide vital research in case studies and foreign policy 
analysis. Many post-apartheid historians’ works argue that the Cold War played a pivotal 
role in American policy towards South Africa.7 The domino theory was key in the US 
involvement of Southern Africa, especially in regards to Angola and Mozambique 
whereby the Soviet Union-backed regimes were seen as enemies of the apartheid state 
and as the “capitalist” stronghold in Africa, South Africa presented itself to US as an 
ideological ally. Eisenhower, as George White argues, allied with the apartheid 
government for aid during the Korean War.8 As an outpost to prevent the spread of 
Communism in Africa, white Afrikaners, while isolated, had the mineral resources of 
gold and uranium critical to US proxy wars.9 This further adds to the wake of inaction 
that follows Eisenhower’s successors. The reaction to Sharpeville also highlights 
Eisenhower’s sensitive relationship with apartheid.  
White acknowledges the inaction of the Eisenhower administration and the 
National Security Council by recalling that meetings pertaining to Sharpeville, often 
revolved around how the US will handle African affairs, not the immediate impact of 69 
black South African deaths.10 Furthermore, White notes the positive Western-centric 
reception of the apartheid government despite the increasing human rights violations by 
the regime on African people.11 T. J. Noer further delves into Eisenhower’s problematic 
                                                 
7 For more analysis of US Cold War Policies in Africa, see the following cited works of Hyman (2015), van 
Wyk (2010), George White (2005), Borstelmann (2001), and Noer (1985).   
8 George White, Holding the Line: Race, Racism, and American Foreign Policy Towards Africa, 1953-
1961 (USA: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2005): 96. 
9 Ibid., 96.  
10 Ibid., 101. 
11 White, 101-102.  
  
 
 
response to Sharpeville using the example of countering bureaucratic responses from the 
State Department and the White House. Noer recalls how State Department Press Officer 
Lincoln White’s press release that condemned the violence and offered US support for 
the rights of black South Africans to express their grievances that was not cleared by his 
superior, the Secretary of State Christian Herter.12 Noer’s explanation of this lack of 
consensus within the Eisenhower administration correlates with White’s argument that 
the US policy in 1960 was more concerned about the policy implications of Sharpeville 
and not the rise of a police state. In that same vein, many post-apartheid historians are 
critical of Eisenhower’s response to Sharpeville. Thomas Borstelmann states that 
Eisenhower chose strategic military and economic advancements with Pretoria over racial 
equality.13 Under Eisenhower, there was never a moral outcry for the end of apartheid 
from US foreign policy; rather, apartheid was a necessary evil to aid the fight against 
Communism.  
For Noer, Cold War politics was the central cause of US-South Africa 
complications and the Kennedy presidency epitomized this push and pull. Noer argues 
that while Kennedy was progressive compared to predecessors, in terms of racial 
representation in the makeup of his administration and decries of human rights abuses, 
there was still serious inaction towards apartheid.14 Coupled with the tension within his 
own administration on what to actually do with Pretoria, Kennedy’s tenure was 
comprised of unfulfilled, half-hearted promises to inefficient policies. Noer recalls 
                                                 
12 T. J. Noer, Cold War and Black Liberation: The United States and White Rule in Africa, 1948-1968 
(USA: University of Missouri Press, 1985), 54-55. 
13 Thomas Borstelmann, Cold War and the Color Line: American Race Relations in the Global Arena, 
(USA: Harvard University Press, 2001), 128. 
14 Noer, 126.  
  
 
 
Kennedy’s shifty attitude towards to Pretoria in having to deal with domestic pushback 
for sanctions and international pressure to align with UN-back sanctions and 
embargoes.15 Zoe Hyman adds to Noer’s criticism of Kennedy’s inaction towards South 
Africa demonstrates a sign of silent compliance with apartheid as opposed to supporting 
the presumed communist terrorist anti-apartheid groups that will be later discussed.16 
Kennedy clearly struggled in creating a domestic consensus to South African relations 
and the attempts to make significant foreign policy change were not fulfilled.       
The literature existing on the Sharpeville massacre is fairly consistent in relaying 
the specifics of the event and in explaining the rise of armed anti-apartheid resistance. 
Tom Lodge’s book on Sharpeville has a complete account of the origins, details, and 
implications of Sharpeville. Sharpeville’s effect on the apartheid regime has often been 
casted as the turning point where resistance group like the African National Congress 
(ANC) and Pan-African Congress (PAC) were banned and went underground.17 
Interestingly, Vineet Thakur states that the massacre was an excuse to ban these groups 
but does not expound on this claim.18 Following this logic, there should be more literature 
pertaining the deliberate action by the South African Defense Unit on the people in 
Sharpeville.  
Where Thakur falls short in explaining his accusatory claim, Lodge notes the 
deliberate cover up by police immediately following the shootings wherein reports of 
                                                 
15 Noer, 128.  
16 Zoe Hyman, “‘To have its cake and eat it too:’ US policy toward South Africa during the Kennedy 
administration,” The Sixties: A Journal of History, Politics and Culture 8, no. 2 (2015), 140-141.  
17 Borstelmann, 127.  
18 Vineet Thakur, “Foreign Policy and its People: Transforming the Apartheid Department of Foreign 
Affairs,” Diplomacy & Statecraft 26 (2015): 525.  
  
 
 
witnesses included claims of weapons being placed in the hands of the fallen.19 So why is 
the horrific event of March 21, 1960 considered as one of the major turning points of 
apartheid history, when it could be classified as a white supremacist victory? The answer 
lies in the underground workings of apartheid resistance that did not have the official 
support of the United States in 1960, only superficial speeches and promises. Thomas 
Borstelmann further criticized Eisenhower as a sympathizer for the white South Africans 
while hoping for racial progress in Atlanta, in reference to his claimed American Civil 
Rights support.20 This analogy best describes US foreign policy in the wake of 
Sharpeville. As the US was grappling with its own race problems in 1960’s, Eisenhower 
and his predecessors justified the weak response to Sharpeville by qualifying the black 
protestors as Communist agitators that could not be helped until Eisenhower fixed its 
domestic problems. 
There exists an intrinsic relationship between South African anti-apartheid 
resistance and the American Civil Rights Movement, and it is therefore impossible to 
discuss America’s role in apartheid politics without acknowledging the domestic 
leadership. A key push by various African-American Civil Rights leaders was for 
economic sanctions and boycotts of South African made goods that were revitalized after 
the Sharpeville Massacre, though many had different theories on how to achieve this 
goal.21 Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. and Malcolm X’s efforts each are a testament to the 
African-American anti-apartheid movement in America to the dichotomy of ideas on how 
                                                 
19 Tom Lodge, Sharpeville: An Apartheid Massacre and its Consequences (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2011), 106.  
20 Borstelmann, 127.  
21 Francis Njubi Nesbitt, Race for Sanctions: African Americans against Apartheid, 1946-1994 
(Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2004), 14, 36. 
  
 
 
to force change in US apartheid policy, which paradoxically often merged together. King 
drew inspiration from the ANC President Albert Lutuli and consistently cited his peaceful 
efforts in speeches across the globe as an early relationship that was likely developed 
when Lutuli came to visit King’s father church in Atlanta, Georgia.22 Nesbitt’s analysis 
of King’s relationship with anti-apartheid resistance is further complicated by the rise of 
armed struggle in the wake of Sharpeville; yet he continued to claim the struggle for race 
equality was equal in importance to both African-Americans and black South Africans.23 
Malcolm X was no doubt influential in the black nationalist branches of US anti-
apartheid movements. In several instances, Malcolm X called upon the West to recognize 
their power in dismantling apartheid through economic sanctions, one notably being at an 
Organization of African Unity Head of State summit in 1964, a position also shared by 
King.24 This was a move of solidarity as he was surrounded by African heads of state in a 
forum that focused on improving Africa’s place on the world stage. Malcolm X serves as 
a counter to the inaction of US officials. While not the focus of this paper, literature 
detailing the efforts by US anti-apartheid leaders are worth noting because of the context 
they serve as pressuring US leaders.  
The underground and rise of armed resistance through the form of Spear of the 
Nation, an ANC branch, in the 1960’s was critical to the eventual fall of apartheid and is 
a testament to the black South African resolve against the white supremacists. In the eyes 
of some historians, the immediate political exile period and the formation of Umkhonto 
                                                 
22 Nesbitt, 31. Also see the work of Lewis V. Baldwin, Toward the Beloved Country: Martin Luther King, 
Jr. and South Africa (Cleveland, Pilgrim Press, 1995), 8-10.  
23 Ibid., 61. 
24 Ibid., 57-61. 
  
 
 
weSizwe, Spear of the Nation, is where the substantive anti-apartheid organized resistance 
began amongst black South Africans. For Janet Cherry, Umkhonto weSizwe represented a 
popular resistance front that many black South Africans endorsed as a viable opponent to 
the oppressive regime.25 The sabotage campaign headed by Umkhonto weSizwe, however, 
created strife within the apartheid resistance despite the conventional narrative of unity in 
their efforts. Paul Landau furthers this claim that Umkhonto weSizwe caused conflicts 
within anti-apartheid leadership by relying on previous historians’ work. Most influential 
from Landau’s work is a commentary on conflict between then ANC-President Albert 
Lutuli, MK leader Nelson Mandela, and the Communist South Africans in terms of how 
armed struggle would proceed. Both Cherry and Landau note that the traditionally 
pacifists ANC members, like Lutuli, were actually supportive of armed resistance after 
Sharpeville.26 Further analysis of Umkhonto weSizwe will further explain the hesitance of 
US involvement in supporting the anti-apartheid movement in the Sharpeville chapter 
that follows.   
Similar to the US reaction to Sharpeville, the United Nations would fall short on 
taking a stand against apartheid despite the best efforts of the African bloc in the General 
Assembly. This ineffective diplomacy lies primarily in the US and United Kingdom’s 
power within the Security Council in carefully navigating the negotiations of sanctions 
and embargoes. Simon Steven’s recent work regarding South Africa provides an analysis 
of the relationship of key anti-apartheid leaders and the UN in the crafting of economic 
                                                 
25 Janet Cherry, Spear of the Nation (Umkhonto weSizwe): South Africa’s Liberation Army, 1960’s-1990’s, 
(USA: Ohio University Press, 2011), 13.  
26 Cherry, 20; Paul Landau, “The ANC, MK, and ‘The Turn to Violence’ (1960-1962),” South African 
Journal of History 64, no. 3 (2012): 540.  
  
 
 
sanctions and arms embargoes resolutions.27 As Sharpeville gained international 
attention, the ANC saw an opportunity to decry the need for global economic sanctions 
spearheaded by the UN yet faced the critical obstacle of universal adherence.28 Stevens 
argues that the increased African representation in the UN created optimism for anti-
apartheid sanction advocates as the UN was becoming “an anti-colonial majority.”29 The 
African bloc within the General Assembly became a significant UN coalition; however, 
the overwhelming veto power of the United Kingdom and US hindered any multilateral 
economic policies regarding South Africa.  
Another important analysis of the UN and US role in South Africa is Ryan Irwin’s 
latest book, analyzing 20th century apartheid politics and its legitimacy during the rise of 
international liberalism through in the UN.30 Irwin follows Stevens’ similar assertion that 
the attempts to apply pressure on the Western states post-Sharpeville was only marginally 
influenced by anti-apartheid resistance groups.31 The groups focused efforts on fostering 
domestic US supporters and pressured the creation of UN special political committees.32 
Irwin’s claims are compared to independent findings in the sections that focus on 
Kennedy’s foreign policy, the Nixon-Kissinger policy that would shape Ford’s attitude to 
Pretoria, and, most importantly, the evolution of the UN action against South Africa in 
the 1960s and 1970s. 
                                                 
27 Simon Steven, “Boycotts and Sanctions against South Africa: An International History, 1946-1970,” 
(PhD diss., Columbia University, New York City, 2016), 176-240.  
28 Ibid., 189.  
29 Ibid., 177.  
30 Ryan Irwin, Gordian Knot: Apartheid and the Unmaking of the Liberal World Order, (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2012).   
31 Ibid., 141-142. 
32 Ibid. 
  
 
 
The role of anti-apartheid leaders within the ANC in prompting UN action 
worked well in keeping South Africa on the UN agenda. Stevens centralizes his argument 
through the ANC figures such as Albert Lutuli and the tension over the rise of violent 
resistance as a means to maintain UN attention.33 As Lutuli continued to preach economic 
sanctions as a means to a peaceful transition from apartheid, Stevens makes the 
significant claim that Lutuli was not a proponent of the establishment of MK.34 This is a 
typical analysis of Lutuli’s relationship with MK’s creation as a Christian man who 
frequently opposed violence; it was other ANC figures, primarily Nelson Mandela, that 
took the charge in creating a violence resistance group within the ANC. This claim was 
recently refuted in the works of scholars who focus on Lutuli.35 Nonetheless, the later 
operational planning of MK was, according to Stevens, prompted by the successful 
Resolution 1761 passage, led by the African bloc, that called for serious boycotts of 
South African goods and the end of trade with the apartheid state.36 Later resolutions 
would dilute this harsh rhetoric with non-mandatory arms embargoes and inspecting 
bodies that the US and UK would support within the Security Council as a way to delay 
substantive multilateral sanction resolutions.37 As the Sharpeville Massacre gained 
worldwide attention, the international organization entrusted in maintaining international 
peace would stand by its founding principle of state sovereignty despite the international 
and domestic cries for reproach.   
                                                 
33 Stevens, “Boycotts and Sanctions against South Africa: An International History, 1946-1970,” 210. 
34Ibid., 211. 
35 See the work of Robert Trent Vinson, “Albert Luthuli’s Private Struggle: How an Icon of Peace Came to 
Accept Sabotage in South Africa,” (2018).   
36 Stevens, “Boycotts and Sanctions against South Africa: An International History, 1946-1970,” 224-225. 
37 Ibid., 231-233.  
  
 
 
The late 1960’s and early 1970’s was known as the high apartheid years wherein 
increased militancy of the government, expansion of Bantustans, and diminished local 
Black control of political affairs became the norm.38 In this interlude period came the 
infamous Rivonia Trial where Nelson Mandela and Walter Sisulu, another ranking ANC 
member, were imprisoned and apartheid occupied South West Africa, modern day 
Namibia. Though both are not the focus of this project, each inform what the apartheid 
government was rapidly evolving to: a totalitarian state with sights set on exerting control 
throughout the region.  
 Yet another turning point in apartheid history was the Soweto Uprising in June 
1976. This marks a significant shift in US foreign policy, particularly on the part of 
President Carter; but as Soweto occurred during President Ford’s tenure, the tradition of 
insignificant response to egregious human rights violations continued. Current existing 
literature, like works on Eisenhower and Kennedy, criticizes the lack of effort to create 
serious policies in sanctioning Pretoria. Borstelmann claims that the lack of policy was 
due, in part, to Ford’s attention to the independence wars in Angola and Rhodesia, similar 
to Eisenhower’s Congo preoccupation.39 In the months leading to the Soweto Uprising, 
Noer asserts the critical role of Henry Kissinger in shaping Ford’s communicative 
relationship with Pretoria Prime Minister Vorster in the Rhodesia transition, something 
that was in the works since Nixon’s term.40 This relationship would obviously hinder 
                                                 
38 For more analysis on the high apartheid period, see the following cited works: Dubow (2015) and Gurney 
(2009).  
39 Borstelmann, 238; Noer, 244.  
40 Borstelmann, 241; Noer, 244.  
  
 
 
serious penalties by the Ford administration in the aftermath of Soweto onto the apartheid 
regime.  
 President Carter, however, brought a reinvigorated vision to US foreign policy 
towards South Africa. Some historians revere Carter for bringing the humanitarian crisis 
of apartheid to the US front pages, yet still criticize him for not doing enough in the form 
of sanctions. Alex Thomson notes Carter’s administration vocally criticized Pretoria yet 
was weak at making serious sanctions against the apartheid government.41 Thomson 
does, however, note Carter’s one clear effort to curb the apartheid government that 
extended the United State Import-Export Bank facilities upkeep for 42 months.42 Carter 
represented a barely noticeable but still important catalyst in the course of US foreign 
policy towards apartheid. Carter’s efforts and struggles to create policy towards the 
apartheid regime is analyzed further within the Soweto Uprising chapter.  
 Moving beyond the Sharpeville Massacre, the South African authorities tightened 
security around the state and the political tensions within the country mounted. As the 
Black Consciousness Movement began, political parties exiled abroad, and the systematic 
imprisonment of anti-apartheid resistance leaders and supporters in cases such as the 
infamous Rivonia trials. Many credit the wave of underground workings to the continued 
resistance to apartheid.43 The works of these scholars, however, neglect critical 
background information of previous demonstrations by youths in other areas against the 
apartheid regime. Julian Brown’s recent work illuminates this traceable history of youth 
                                                 
41 Alex Thomson, “The Diplomacy of Impasse: The Carter Administration and Apartheid South Africa,” 
Diplomacy & Statecraft 21 (2010): 115. 
42 Ibid.  
43 See the works of Robert Kinloch Massie’s Loosing the Bonds: The United States and South Africa in the 
Apartheid Years and Baruch Hirson’s Year of Fire, Year of Ash: The Soweto Revolt- Roots of a Revolution? 
  
 
 
grassroots resistance, without the aid of older, established political mechanisms to carry 
their message.44 These differing claims of the roots of the Soweto Uprising is what makes 
placing it difficult, as youths without obvious outward support of older, more established 
resistance parties demonstrated against the forced education mandates of Afrikaans as the 
medium of instruction.  
Rather than the Soweto Uprising being just an explosive expression of pent up 
anger, Brown argues that the beginnings of youth resistance started in the universities and 
carried through to the primary schools as dialogue was exchanged between school 
children that followed the ideology of Black Consciousness.45 Brown goes further to 
assert that the Soweto Uprising and the violence that continued in the weeks after June 16 
was completely different from previous demonstrations because it was impossible to 
avoid the apartheid state role in the deliberate execution of black children. This claim, 
however, ignores the growing role of international anti-apartheid groups that developed 
after the Sharpeville Massacre played in ensuring apartheid remained a key conversation 
in the US and the UN agendas. The final chapter of this project analyzes the international 
and United States community reactions to the Soweto Uprising. The Soweto Uprising is 
significant in the same vein of Sharpeville: both are horrific events that caught 
international tension to exposing the world’s compliance with apartheid while forcing 
internal reflection of anti-apartheid tactics from fringe groups that influenced the ANC 
cause. 
                                                 
44 Julian Brown, The Road to Soweto: Resistance and the Uprising of 16 June 1976, (USA: Boydell & 
Brewer, 2016).  
45 Brown, 158.  
  
 
 
The works cited throughout this chapter were critical to establish a consensus of 
where the historiography is currently at in understanding the Sharpeville Massacre and 
the Soweto Uprising. Further chapters will continue to build on these works and reference 
them in greater detail. Often the primary documents cited within these chapters were 
utilized by these authors. A different interpretation is provided with the special interest in 
creating a comparative analysis where the Sharpeville and Soweto victims and actors are 
central to the conversation even when not necessarily the focus of political leaders. One 
thing is clear from the review of these works: the role of the US and the UN in apartheid 
politics that surrounded these atrocities is complex and the real victims were lost amongst 
the diplomatic negotiations. It was the pressure groups that ensured the question of 
apartheid remained on the international agenda.  
To fully understand the complexities of these events and their effects, key actions 
by US foreign policy advisors, UN envoys, South African apartheid politicians, and 
resistance figures are analyzed within this paper. This project relies primarily on the 
works of past historians and political theorists which often conflict with one another in 
the motivations of the US, South Africa, and UN regarding apartheid and such disparities 
are analyzed in a literature review. The following chapters highlights recently 
declassified material, archival databases of apartheid resistance, and US and UN archives 
which contribute to the discussion of apartheid foreign policy relations during two coined 
turning points.  
Chapter 2: A Day in March 
In efforts to understand the impact of the Sharpeville Massacre on US foreign 
policy, it is important to clearly grasp the fundamental details of the tragedy that would 
  
 
 
shape the apartheid regime narrative and, by proxy, US foreign policy. As part of a Pan-
African Congress (PAC) effort to resist the inherently discriminatory pass book laws, 
PAC leader Robert Sobukwe led a hastily composed nationwide campaign by gathering 
local PAC branches, where they went to the nearby police stations in their area without 
their pass books and deliberately got arrested.46 The Sharpeville PAC branch was not 
alone in the protest against pass books, yet what made the protest in Sharpeville unique 
was the mass participation and the state polices’ violent reaction.  
 On March 21, 1960, protesters gathered around the Sharpeville police precinct at 
approximately around 8 AM.47 The PAC Task Force deliberately pressured the shutdown 
of transportation leaving Sharpeville so workers could not go to work that Monday 
morning by harassing bus drivers.48 The logic of this move was to further demonstrate to 
the apartheid government that if black Africans could not work because they were 
arrested, then the entire state was at a virtual standstill in terms of economic production.49 
This lofty idea was partially achieved by cutting off transportation lines, thereby forcing 
workers to participate in the protest. The leaders of the Sharpeville PAC branch were two 
brothers, Nyakane and Job Tsolo, and each played an evident part in the organization of 
the protest.50 The Tsolo brothers encouraged Sobukwe to come to Sharpeville to 
participate in their protest in efforts to bolster more support for the local black 
                                                 
46 Petrus Tom, “Sharpeville: March 21, 1960,” Federation of South African Trade Unions, 
http://disa.ukzn.ac.za/fwaug8515627624000040aug198523. 
47 Tom Lodge, 93. 
48 Ambrose Reeves, Commission of Enquiry into the Occurrences at Sharpeville (and other places) on the 
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population. Sobukwe would avoid the forthcoming tragedy by participating in the 
Orlando protest and getting arrested there.51 The absence of notable leaders like 
Sobukwe, however, did not hinder the protest by the Sharpeville branch.  
In the official South African government Commission on the Sharpeville 
shootings, there were a claimed 20,000 participants.52 Bishop Ambrose Reeves, who was 
not in Sharpeville but would soon visit the township after, interviewed locals and looked 
at photographs taken throughout the day. Following this, he claimed it was more likely 
that 5,000 people participated in the protests surrounding the police station.53 The 
discrepancy over the numbers is critical when understanding the alibi that police would 
immediately construct after they fired live ammunition. It is easier to claim defense when 
the police are outnumbered. Much of the official account, published in late April by P. J. 
Wessels, provides various accounts and eyewitness testimony that discredit the PAC’s 
nonviolent appeals and depicts the apartheid police as restrained and acting in self-
defense.54 The atmosphere of the crowd is also not agreed upon. In an address to the 
House of Assembly, Verwoerd claims the crowd had quickly began to riot.55 Yet again, 
there are countering reports from eyewitnesses and photographs that document a joyous 
environment where people gathered in song, laughter, and smiles in front of the police 
station.56 There were later reports by a journalist, Humphrey Tyler, who saw the crowd as 
                                                 
51 Lodge, 89 
52 Reeves, 37. 
53 Ibid.  
54 P.J. Wessels, Report on the Commission Appointed to Investigate and Report on the Occurrences in the 
Districts of Vereeniging (Namely, at Sharpeville Location and Evaton), and Vanderbijlpark, Province of 
the Transvaal, on 21st March 1960, April 13, 1960, University of South Africa Institutional Repository.  
55 Reeves, 38 
56 Wessels, 91.  
  
 
 
“amiable,” of women crying out, “Izwelethu,” our land, in Xhosa.57 The difference 
between crowd estimates and attitudes not only demonstrate a lack of consensus within 
the documents but a conflict over the Sharpeville narrative.  
To add to the disparities between the protestors and police, the Sharpeville police 
leaders failed to agree on negotiating with the Tsolo brothers. This was, in part, due to the 
leader of the incoming reinforcements, Lieutenant Colonel Pienaar, and his refusal to 
meet with the outside crowd and discuss the situation with anyone.58 Reeves, looking 
back on this lack of communication, makes the claim that this critical connection could 
have made a difference in police-protestor relations as the day continued.59 Further 
discrepancies within the apartheid police force in communicating is analyzed in in a later 
subchapter on how the apartheid government handled the Sharpeville community post-
March 21.  
Over the span of eight hours on March 21, the protesters who gathered in front of 
the precinct voiced their anger at the racial prejudice they experienced, demanded arrest 
for lacking the derogatory pass books, and many were then deliberately executed or 
injured by the state. This type of state behavior was not surprising under apartheid rule, 
but the scale and publicity of the violence in a single instance is what surprised many. In 
the aftermath of Sharpeville came the consolidation of the African National Congress 
(ANC) in their messaging & tactics of resistance, all brought forth by pressure from the 
PAC, and the awakening of the international masses to question the legitimacy of 
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apartheid rule. Sharpeville was the first step in this new future where Black South 
Africans would dramatically shift state policy. 
2.1 Learning the Hard Way: The Apartheid Response to Sharpeville 
Recovering from the public backlash from the first mass atrocity was a difficult 
field to navigate for the South African government. For the apartheid police, the first 
strategy regarding Sharpeville was a deliberate cover up of evidence in the hours after the 
shootings. In the messaging and framing of the massacre, the apartheid government was 
careful to shift blame to the protestors. In one New York Times report, the South African 
High Commission’s statement claimed the demonstrators fired the first shots, and the 
police were forced to open fire to avoid “even more tragic results.”60 This report was 
given to the New York Times five days after the shootings on behalf of the South African 
Ministry of External Affairs.61 This statement asserts a very serious accusation that the 
protesters were armed and creates a narrative of defensive tactics by the Sharpeville 
police. However, later reports by the South African government would complicate the 
details of Sharpeville. More malicious intentions were quickly executed in effort hide in 
the aftermath of Sharpeville by the police. In one report, Lieutenant Colonel Pienaar was 
quoted saying, “If they (black South Africans) do these things they must learn the hard 
way.”62 As the same Lieutenant Colonel in charge of bringing in reinforcements, 
Pienaar’s statement directly goes against the self-defense narrative and shifts the 
intentions of police officers to deliberate harm in efforts to curb the protesters and aligns 
more with the evidence of the police cover up.  
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 P. J. Wessels’ report, completed on June 16, creates Pretoria’s own version of the 
truth that would work to discredit the further resistance efforts to change apartheid 
policies and garner international support. Wessels discredits witnesses multiple times 
throughout the report. Perhaps most notable is the character attacks on Job Tsolo, who 
Wessels identities as the leader between him and Nyakane. Noting a PAC meeting, Tsolo 
stated, “We are ready to destroy white domination… there is no freedom without 
bloodshed,” Wessels asserts that PAC leaders made no attempt to quail the violent 
tendencies of its followers.63 This is where Tom Lodge’s later analysis of PAC meetings 
and understanding of police infiltration of PAC membership plays a significant role.64 It 
is likely that Tsolo was aware of possible police spying on the meetings and rationalized 
that if the police knew how serious the PAC was in protesting the passbooks then they 
would gain their respect as citizens protesting their government. Therefore, Wessels 
claim that all PAC leaders were deliberately publishing campaigns that endorsed violence 
against the police is fraudulent because it neglects to see the theorizing by PAC leaders.  
 Most notable about the aftermath of Sharpeville is the forced exile of all Black 
political parties and the shift to underground resistance. The language of the previous 
bans played a significant role in further establishing Pretoria as a West-friendly African 
state on the international stage. Beginning with the Suppression of Communism Act in 
1950, the apartheid government wanted to control any rogue ideas against the state. It 
would be future Prime Minister B. J. Vorster who added that this Communism Act 
included former members of the Communist party.65 This a critical point in apartheid 
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politics because it created the precedent of targeted banning of individuals that Pretoria 
finds troublesome and further utilized post-Sharpeville.  
After Sharpeville, any organizations deemed communist or rebellious towards the 
government was banned in efforts to secure the state. This Unlawful Organizations Act 
specifically named the ANC and PAC in their legislation and anyone associated with the 
organizations were imprisoned.66 Later legislation continued to connect resistance 
organizations to communism. Pretoria passed the 76th amendment to the General Laws 
known as the Sabotage Act in 1962 that allowed for the 90-day imprisonment of anyone 
suspected to be sabotaging the state.67 Sabotage was broadly defined to allow for targeted 
policing of prominent resistance leaders, like Nelson Mandela who was imprisoned based 
on this legislation. What is worth noting is that a portion of international community saw 
the faulted argument. The London-based, New African, newspaper demonstrated the 
futility of going after the ANC and PAC in the name of stopping communism because the 
communist party had no interest in ending racial oppression.68 Despite this fact, seen later 
in the analysis of the US and international reaction, the belief that resistance forces had 
ties to communism justified the continued relationship with the capitalist-defending 
apartheid regime.  
2.2 The Assassination Attempt on Verwoerd  
Only weeks after the events in Sharpeville, South Africa was once again central to 
the international stage when Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd nearly died in an 
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assassination attempt. The relationship between the assassination attempt and the 
aftermath of Sharpeville are intrinsically connected. The assassination attempt provided 
an out for the government to ignore the racial violence and focus on restoring the image 
of a functioning state with an injured leader.  
Reports stated that an increase of police presence in Johannesburg was the first 
increase since the “presence crisis nearly three weeks ago.”69 No longer were the events 
of Sharpeville mentioned except in allusions or in passing. The days following the 
assassination attempt, the New York Times involved a full page spread on the event, 
including a report on Verwoerd’s work in constructing apartheid, English Queen 
Elizabeth II’s well wishes for recovery, and calls by the apartheid government for a 
return to normalcy.70 It was more noteworthy, at least within the US, to discuss the 
assassination attempt on a white man than the deliberate and consistent oppression of 
blacks in that same country. The Verwoerd 1960 assassination attempt is worth 
mentioning because the attempt allowed the state to ignore the racial tragedy of the 
Sharpeville Massacre. In the wake of this near Afrikaner tragedy, the South African 
government was able to momentarily shift away from the international pressure of 
legitimizing apartheid after Sharpeville. Verwoerd was, effectively, a near martyr for the 
Nationalist cause.  
2.3 The South African Problem: The US Response to Sharpeville 
US foreign policy towards South Africa in the 1960’s supports Eisenhower’s 
complacent attitude towards the apartheid government. Eisenhower’s relationship is 
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founded in the need for a militarily sound, anti-communist relationship with an assumed 
stable African state during the tumultuous time of African statehood. The immediate 
reaction of the US was partly influenced by Lincoln White’s notable statement of 
deploring the action and acknowledging the typical protocol of not commenting on 
“internal affairs of governments with which [the US] enjoys normal relations,” but the 
mass loss of life forced the US to comment.71 White’s statement was impromptu and not 
cleared by Secretary of State Herter. Both Eisenhower and Herter viewed the statement as 
a mistake. Herter would call the statement, “a breach of courtesy,” between South Africa 
and the US.72 Eisenhower used the unique imagery of fat already in the fire and it was too 
late to publicly retract the statement.73 The White Statement highlights the lack of 
consensus the Eisenhower White House had on South African relations, and this 
shocking massacre exposed such inconsistency.  
The worries of Eisenhower and Herter’s regarding White’s statement was met 
when Philip Crowe, the US ambassador to South Africa, telegrammed Herter warning 
that the Afrikaners felt as though the statement was made at their expense in order to gain 
favor with Black South Africans.74 This blowback presented a potentially problematic 
foreign relations situation especially when South Africa and the US were in the middle of 
negotiating a secret base establishment for a missile and satellite outpost in the region.75 
Only after the US carefully worded their contact with South African officials and 
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spearheaded moderate UN resolutions did the Nationalist party feel secure in their 
relationship. Yet it is important to note that rebuking South African police neglect in 
Sharpeville was never Eisenhower’s priority. For him, it was more important to secure an 
anti-communist stronghold in an emerging, fledgling continent. A stable Africa would 
also maintain US attention in Southeast Asia as US involvement in Vietnam was 
escalating concurrently.  
Those within the Eisenhower administration differed on the potential impact of 
Sharpeville on domestic and international policy. Crowe claimed that the eventual 
radicalization of Blacks after the massacre would create a “dangerous and explosive 
situation,” that would counter to US interests in the region.76 Crowe, later in the same 
document, posits that continued repression of non-whites coupled with the radicalization 
could turn the state into a warzone.77 Those endangered US interests were the natural 
resources and capital that Eisenhower was so keen to protect such as uranium and gold. 
In the CIA’s July 1960 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), South Africa was predicted 
to become an isolationist state.78 These worries were met when South Africa voluntarily 
left the British Commonwealth after a 52% white only referendum in October.79 The UN 
General Assembly would later in 1974 vote to suspend South Africa’s participation.80 An 
isolated and potentially civil war endangered state did not make for a good trading ally on 
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the African continent and Crowe represented the few in the Eisenhower White House 
who were hesitant towards allying with Pretoria.  
Countering the bleak predictions of some Eisenhower advisors, there were some 
that show an opportunity to advance US assets in the region. CIA Chief Allen Dulles 
claimed at a National Security Council meeting that the massacre and radicalization of 
Blacks presented an opportunity to smuggle arms to the “natives of South Africa,” to 
undermine the white government.81 This would not have been unprecedented in US Cold 
War policy but typically this theory would be implemented in support of capitalist rebel 
groups to overthrow communist regimes. As such, no further evidence shows that Dulles’ 
idea was executed. For the white US public, the Blacks of South Africa were communist 
while the Nationalist party was the stronghold of capitalism on the dark continent. 
Dulles’ thinking proves significant as a part of the US government that was in favor of at 
least a weaker white rule in South Africa, not perhaps full equal rule. Yet again Dulles’ 
statement highlights a focus to advance US assets by selling to both parties of the racial 
war in South Africa, why not benefit from this animosity?  
 Sharpeville’s impact was not unnoticed by the candidates in the upcoming 1960 
election. While on the campaign trail when Sharpeville happened, Kennedy’s advisors 
knew how crucial it was to garner support by presenting him as a foreign policy expert. 
In a campaign brief to help Kennedy formulate a position on African independence, 
Professor Fred Burke called for Kennedy to remain focused on Africa stating, “the future 
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of America is bound up with the future of Africa.”82 Kennedy released a public statement 
that strongly criticized the South African government for their continued oppression of 
the black majority.83 This type of language, of course, was rolled back once Kennedy 
entered the White House.  
 Upon entering the White House, Kennedy was concerned with the rhetoric of 
peace rather than the practice of it. In preparing for Kennedy’s address to the UN 18th 
General Assembly, Kennedy focused on the context of how to include human rights in 
the speech.84 Kennedy chose to end the meeting shortly after this statement. This short 
transcript encompasses Kennedy’s rhetorical support for improved human rights in the 
world therefore it is acceptable to infer that Kennedy had that same weak focus on the 
practical application of human rights in specific regards to apartheid South Africa.   
Kennedy’s administration dealt with an array of issues surrounding South Africa. 
Given the emerging role of the UN, the pressing need for uranium and gold, and a 
demand by military experts to secure a stronghold in Africa the Kennedy White House, 
similar to Eisenhower, failed to spur real change in the apartheid policy simply because it 
was not a clear focus of the administration. It is easy to assume that Kennedy sought a 
fair human rights situation in Pretoria but, similar to other Kennedy decisions, the public 
image of the White House was more important than substantive actions.  
  The South African problem grew even more difficult in the wake of Sharpeville 
in the international institution of peace. As the Afro-Asian bloc began to draft resolutions 
                                                 
82 Briefing Paper for Senator Kennedy, by Professor Fred Burke. Papers of Papers of John F. Kennedy, 
Pre-Presidential Papers. Presidential Campaign Files, 1960. John F. Kennedy Presidential Library. 
83 Remarks of Senator John F Kennedy, March 26, 1960. Papers of Papers of John F. Kennedy, Pre-
Presidential Papers. Presidential Campaign Files, 1960. John F. Kennedy Presidential Library.  
84 Strategy at the 18th General Assembly, Sept 9, 1963. William Brubeck Personal Files, Box 387 A, South 
Africa 9/63-11/63. John F. Kennedy Presidential Library. 
  
 
 
rebuking Pretoria, Kennedy’s team continued to cite that international sanctions could not 
be placed on a state that did not pose an international threat.85 Thus continuing respect for 
the UN founding principle of sovereignty throughout the Cold War. The May 1963 
creation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) created worries in the UN US 
Mission. G. Mennen “Soapy” Williams, as Assistant Secretary of State for African 
Affairs, was the first one of Kennedy’s best and brightest to see that the Addis Ababa 
conference would complicate US-UN relationships regarding South Africa by moving it 
to a Chapter VII discussion: actions with respect to threats to the peace.86 In that instance, 
the OAU entered the General Assembly in July 1963 ready to dismantle apartheid on the 
international stage and disregarded Western traditions of appeasing South Africa through 
trade.   
 Two components to US-South African relations were already previously 
discussed during the Eisenhower administration: military and minerals. In the aftermath 
of Sharpeville, Kennedy’s administration would attempt to minimize trade relations with 
the apartheid government due to the pressure from African states. Kennedy’s State 
Department and National Security Council explored the possibility of canceling the 
uranium and other mineral trade agreements. The Executive Office of the President 
argued for a gradual decrease in mineral procurement to be leveled in 1970.87 Others 
were concerned that cancellations would lead the South Africans to trade uranium to the 
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Soviets or Chinese.88 Soapy was worried a continued economic partnership with South 
Africa would invite retaliation against the US.89 Such debate continued through 
September 1963 but Kennedy continued the uranium trade with Pretoria to ensure a 
Western alliance and a continual supply for the nuclear weapons.90 This facet of US-
South African relations during Kennedy’s tenure proved not surprising during the Cold 
War. Kennedy justified that buying from the capitalist stronghold in Africa was better 
than that stronghold selling to the Soviet enemy, despite the fact the Partial Nuclear Test 
Ban Treaty was signed a month prior.91  
 In the wake of African decolonialism, Kennedy frequently struggled to take the 
neutral middle road between the African nationalists and the white colonial powers. 
Encompassing the hurdles of the Kennedy administration, further insight into Kennedy’s 
stance comes from a phone conversation in July 1963 with George Ball, his 
Undersecretary of State at the time. Kennedy was preparing for his phone call with Julius 
Nyerere, eventual Tanzanian President and founding member of OAU, when he remarked 
to Ball that he will appease Nyerere. The topic of the conversation was siding with the 
Afro-Asian bloc on UN sanctions and limiting uranium purchases and other trading with 
apartheid, to which Kennedy stated he would tell Nyerere he’s considering it in order to 
curry favor with the African nationalist.92 Like Eisenhower, the struggles to preserve an 
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economic and military relationship with apartheid was fraught with backlash from 
oppositional forces. However, in Kennedy’s frequent attempts to establish amicable 
relations with new African states, he often appeared more hypocritical than trustworthy.  
 This regular obstacle is seen further in Kennedy’s official position towards South 
African resistance groups. Department of State Executive Secretary William Brubeck 
wrote to Kennedy’s National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy that while the US has 
done nothing to support the communist-dominated ANC, they have also not given aid to 
the anti-Communist force of the PAC.93 This anti-Communist stance of the PAC is likely 
from the State Department special report in which pages are dedicated to the Communist 
influence over the ANC while the PAC favored a more African-based consensus 
regarding organization despite its weaker positioning on the international stage.94 This 
carefully calculated support for the comparably weaker political party is further informed 
by Kennedy’s need to safeguard his image as a man of peace while trading with the 
apartheid regime.  
Soapy focused on preserving a positive Kennedy image in Africa relations while 
the tense race relations in the US continued. In a telegram to the President, on the eve of 
the controversial Export-Import Bank loan of $9.8 million to Pretoria, Soapy warned of 
the potential fallout if Kennedy approved of the loan. Soapy claimed it would engender a 
race war that was far more complex and dangerous than the East-West divide they were 
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experiencing with the Soviet Union.95 By attempting to shift US foreign priorities, Soapy 
explains the apartheid policy in Cold War terms. This was telegram came soon after the 
infamous 16th Street Baptist Church bombing where the white supremacist Ku Klux Klan 
murdered four black schoolgirls. Soapy included in the telegram that approving the loan 
would prove, “particularly unfortunate” given recent domestic politics.96 This telegram 
epitomizes Kennedy’s relationship with apartheid. Kennedy was essentially stuck 
safeguarding US economic and geopolitical interests versus criticizing apartheid policies. 
How could Kennedy give $9.8 million dollars to a white minority ruled state mere days 
after a white supremacist group bombed a black church in Alabama? Quite simply he 
could on the premise of protecting America’s national security. A similar issue with the 
Export-Import Bank would arise in Jimmy Carter’s presidency, as discussed in the 
literature review chapter.  
 For such a horrific event, Sharpeville did not make substantive changes to US 
policies despite the efforts of pressure groups in the UN and domestically. Both 
Eisenhower and Kennedy worked within the scope of the Cold War and by Cold War 
standards, 69 Black South Africans were marginal compared to the military advantages 
of a white-ruled African ally. Throughout the late 1960’s and into the 1970’s, the Afro-
Asian bloc continued to challenge the UN and dwindle by US stance on state sovereignty 
or the veto power. Sixteen years after Sharpeville came new US leadership, shifting 
power in the UN, and a sound apartheid resistance force that was faced with yet another 
catalyst in apartheid rule: the Soweto Uprising on 1976.  
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Chapter 3: “The powder keg” in June 1976  
The South Western Township, Soweto, in 1976 was an overcrowded, under 
resourced township which was not a unique story for the South African townships that 
surrounded Johannesburg. One difference between Sharpeville, peaceful and small in 
comparison to Soweto township, and Soweto was the township’s perception to white 
South Africans. Though Sharpeville was the model township, Soweto did not hold such 
accolade.97 Soweto was known for its urban population that travelled into Johannesburg 
for work, high crime rates, and overwhelming youth population.98 Furthermore, the 
apartheid state, while flourishing in the high apartheid period as black opposition went 
underground and apartheid was unchallenged, continued to encroach on life in these 
townships when the government reformed local administrative offices that took further 
control away from black South Africans and diminished their ability to self-govern.  
The Soweto Uprising represents a split in the narrative, as discussed in Chapter 1. 
The current ANC narrative perpetuates the hegemony of the ANC, even in exile, they 
directed the youth protests, further claiming the “Party that Ended Apartheid,” identity.99 
Interestingly enough, while the narrative of Sharpeville was changed by the apartheid 
government, Soweto continues to be a pinnacle of the ANC’s identity as the anti-
apartheid party. Control of the narrative or the memory of Soweto, however, is not the 
focus of this paper though it is critical to understanding the documents of the domestic 
reaction to Soweto.  
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From its inception, Soweto’s student-led protest had an entirely different 
organization style and method than Sharpeville. According to Julian Brown, the Soweto 
Uprisings were sophisticated and, perhaps most surprisingly, grassroot organized. This 
in-depth organizational structure is credited to the Black Consciousness Movement 
(BCM) of early 1970’s and its creator, Steve Biko. Steve Biko’s theory of Black 
Consciousness swept through the South African youth population, from grade school to 
university level, and is what made the Soweto Uprising and its subsequent protests 
possible. Essential to Black Consciousness was the belief that to end the oppression of 
apartheid, blacks had to shed the internal feeling of inferiority.100  
Echoing Biko’s sentiments that black inferiority is felt shared with South Africa’s 
Indian and Colored populations, Oliver Tambo claimed Black Consciousness reflected, 
“the consciousness of the rights of man.”101 The youth of South Africa were receptive to 
Black Consciousness as multiple student organizations arose from Biko’s theory of 
equality.102 The South African Student Organization (SASO), as one of the central 
student groups, was central to energizing Soweto youth. As an organization that 
countered the multiracial demographic of the National Union of South African Students 
(NUSAS), SASO strengthened black identity through publications that celebrated 
blackness.103 SASO was, in retrospect, was essential to the development of the Soweto 
Students’ Representative Council (SSRC) as it became the central organization around 
BCM. Ironically, SASO garnered national attention because the apartheid government 
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elevated its platform through the courts. In the May 1975 case where thirteen SASO 
members, known as the Pretoria Thirteen. were arrested under the Terrorism Act of 1967, 
for organizing a celebration of Mozambique independence.104 Similar to the Defiance 
Campaign’s influence over the 1960 passbook protests, this attention that SASO garnered 
from the courts would inform the works of the SSRC in organizing against the Bantu 
education reforms.   
The Afrikaans Medium Decree of 1974 prompted immediate backlash by 
students, parents, and educators. Changes to the education system in the townships came 
from the Minister of Bantu Education, Michiel Botha. The language medium changed 
from English to Afrikaans, otherwise known as the language of the oppressor. This 
language change deliberately disadvantaged black schoolchildren as English was, despite 
all efforts by the apartheid government to elevate the Afrikaans language, the main 
language of South African business and, “essential for any youth who wanted to find a 
place inside the economy.”105 These early student protests and walk outs were frequent 
but inconsequential compared to what would occur June 16, 1976.    
On that June morning, nearly fifteen hundred schoolchildren gathered at 7:30 
AM, after hasty organization on June 13 when Tebello Motapanyane assembled the 
Action Committee within SSRC, with plans to march from Orlando West Junior 
Secondary School, one of three secondary schools in Soweto, to the Orlando Stadium.106 
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Motapanyane, in an interview nearly six months later, asserted that the youth of South 
Africa believed in “positive action,” like the armed struggle of Umkhonto weSizwe and 
attacking police even if they did not have arms.107 As more students in nearby schools 
were told of their assigned walk out schedule by the Action Committee, the crowds grew 
as police surrounded children holding signs that read, “Down with Afrikaans,” or 
“Afrikaans is oppressors language.”108 Reports of violent contact between police and 
students were not reported until 10 AM where exiled anti-apartheid activist Baruch 
Hirson reports students took to damaging property and storefronts in the area.109 
Specifically outside Orlando West Secondary school, conflicts began around 
10:30 AM when a policeman threw a tear gas cannister to a group of students singing 
‘Nkosi Sikelel’ iAfrica,’ a notable anti-apartheid freedom song, while another fired on 
them thus ensuing panic in the crowd, as reported by Sophie Tema from The World 
newspaper.110 This violence continued in the township for several days, where blacks 
were seen fleeing into official buildings, burning them, and attacking police while the 
police and reinforced paramilitary contingents came into the township with the same 
armored cars used in Sharpeville to root out the violence.111 The official number of dead 
protestors was 176, while the number of causalities were well over 500 as reported by the 
apartheid government.112  
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Taking control of narrative in Soweto was made more difficult by the very fact 
that gaining control over the township would not be easy for apartheid officials as riots 
continued in the weeks succeeding June 16. For Motapanyane, in recalling the events, he 
remained steadfast that the motive for protest was the change of language of instruction 
to Afrikaans, describing it as the spark to the powder keg, already poised to explode.113 In 
the days that followed, worldwide reports of riots drew attention to the structural damage 
by Soweto youth and the apartheid government attempt to exert totalitarian control over 
the township through border control, presence of military grade equipment, and 
checkpoints.114  
3.2 “The Black Man knows his place:” The Apartheid Response to Soweto 
 While the national radio broadcast at 9 pm on June 16 said Soweto was “under 
complete control,” the apartheid police continued to monitor the Soweto youth in the 
months after June 16.115 Furthermore, Prime Minister Vorster made sure to immediately 
call attention to culprits as black students who are, “destroying their own amenities,” 
while “law and order are more important,” to Vorster than anything else.116 As the rioting 
continued and organizations continued the calls for the end of oppressive policies in the 
coming months, apartheid’s attempt to regain control of Soweto proved difficult. The first 
case of apartheid’s attempt came with the ban of mass funerals of the Soweto victims 
organized by the Black Parents Association. For the grieving families, the Minister of 
Police’s refusal to allow public funeral services for the victims of the Uprisings was a 
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way to hide apartheid responsibility for the children’s murders. Instead of following these 
bans, Soweto youth held demonstrations at the internment sites of fallen youths and often 
times, altercations arose between youth and police while families and friends chanted 
phrases such as, “We shall overcome,” and police fired shots.117 The processing of grief 
could not be silenced, and neither could the demands for equality. 
 Similar to Sharpeville, the need to seize control of the narrative came from the 
commissioned report to detail the events of Soweto that was released on July 2. The 
Commission of Inquiry into the Riots of Soweto and Other Places in the Republic of 
South Africa During June 1976 report was the central apartheid response to the Uprising 
and done solely to justify the government’s treatment of black South Africans.118 
Comprised of 69 volumes of reporting, the Cillie Commission did everything it could to 
shift blame from the Soweto police forces to the rioting youths. In the compiling of 
evidence, Cillie often cites the unwillingness of witnesses to come forth with information 
on recent arrests for fear of victimization, though stands by the government’s official 
policy of releasing prisoners in a timely manner.119 This official policy held the release of 
prisoners not convicted but, as acknowledged by Internal Security Act No. 79, this policy 
quickly turned into a tool of monitoring the voices of activists by imprisoning them with 
no foreseeable release date.120 While altercations continued during the following months, 
the police deterred people willing to come forward to the Commission. This deliberate 
police deterrence, however, was not ever highlighted in the state report.  
                                                 
117 Hirson, 207-208. 
118 The Inquiry will be referred to as the Cillie Commission, after Justice Cillie who compiled the report 
over a number of months.    
119 Cillie Commission, 4.1.5-7.  
120 Government of the Union of South Africa, “Internal Security Act No. 79,” O’Malley Archives. 
  
 
 
 The Commission further detailed a central figure in the Soweto Uprising, Hector 
Pieterson. Pieterson was a twelve-year-old boy who joined in the protests with his friends 
and sister. The photograph of a boy carrying Pieterson’s lifeless body almost immediately 
became a worldwide symbol of the brutality of apartheid. The Cillie Commission 
responded to news stations’ claims that Pieterson’s death was a cold blood murder by 
stating that Pieterson was a victim of a stray bullet, not intended for him.121 All of this, 
despite the fact that Pieterson was shot in the back and after the photograph circulated, 
the young man depicted as carrying Pieterson had flee South Africa to avoid police 
questioning.122    
 Like the reaction to Sharpeville, the apartheid government sought complete 
control over Soweto, however, Soweto would never fully be returned to full apartheid 
control. As key figures were chased into exiled, the Minister of Justice, Jimmy Kruger, 
used government censorship and overreach to further disband anti-apartheid groups that 
participated in the Uprising and shut down The World, a black controlled magazine in the 
Republic in 1977.123 While the Cillie report concluded the Uprising was not the result of 
an oppressive government, the imprisonment and eventual murder of Steve Biko 
reminded anti-apartheid activists of this incredulously false statement.124  
3.3 The Problem with Allies: The US Response to Soweto 
 President Gerald Ford’s handling of the Soweto Uprising was complicated not 
only by his altogether weak foreign policy practices in the age of emerging statehoods 
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and rise in Middle East conflicts but further by his Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger’s, 
relationship with apartheid leaders. To briefly overview the US-South African relations 
prior to the Uprising, Ford had high hopes of Kissinger working with Prime Minister 
Vorster via ambassador Botha to normalize the situation in Angola as Cubans were being 
sent to fight alongside rebel fighters.125 The ever popular domino theory was further 
applied in the Angola crisis for fears that if Cubans were able to seize control of Angola, 
they could easily take Namibia which was still occupied by South African forces.126 This 
close reliance on South Africa as an ally is worth of further analysis because it explains 
the US’ lackluster response to the Uprising. 
 The US role in Southern Africa was best epitomized by Kissinger’s conversations 
with apartheid leadership. In June, Kissinger and Vorster discussed how to use South 
African infrastructure to limit the capabilities of Rhodesian resistance fighters and 
monitor the outcome of Rhodesian leadership changes while maintaining South African 
hegemony.127 The South African structural sabotage practices ranged from deliberate 
corruption within Mozambique private railways and severing telecommunications lines 
within Botswana, all done to disadvantage exiled anti-apartheid leaders in neighboring 
states.128 Vorster justified his administration’s actions by saying, “That’s Africa,” to 
mean anything goes when your state has the superior resources and maintains regional 
hegemony.129 It’s clear that Kissinger and, by proxy, Ford had no intentions of severing 
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ties with their South African ally, even after another state-sponsored massacre. This 
propping up of a friendly state in Southern Africa is even further highlighted by 
Kissinger’s May conversation with Botha stating, “we are not trying to reform you…” 
but rather, “history is against you, but we want to buy some time at least.”130 While 
Ford’s administration acknowledged the continued rise of African statehood, they 
willingly sustained an archaic system of oppression by supporting South Africa. Ford’s 
excuse for maintaining relations is best described in his conversation with Kissinger the 
day of June 16 with, “what we are trying to do is overcome things like this,” this being a 
direct response to Kissinger’s explanation of the Soweto Uprising as apartheid officials 
managing to kill more rioters.131 
 Upon the news of the Uprising, the US Mission to the UN took a counter 
approach by conforming to UN consensus to condemn South Africa through the US 
ambassador Albert Sherer, Jr. In the June 19 statement, Sherer called for harmony in 
South Africa in a Security Council resolution condemning the apartheid actions in 
Soweto while making an importance distinction that such condemnation does not mean 
the endorsement of Article VII of the UN Charter action, the use of military force to 
maintain peace within a state by the Security Council.132 While promoting peace in the 
UN, the US continued the advantageous relationship with apartheid under the Ford 
administration, just as it had under Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy.  
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 Moving beyond the analysis given in the Literature Review, President Jimmy 
Carter’s presidency posed unique rhetoric stance on apartheid similar to President 
Kennedy. In an early 1977 interview with publishers and broadcasters, Carter claimed to 
have an evolving policy in transitioning South Africa to majority rule.133 Carter 
surrounded himself with human rights activists in his cabinet leadership, which helped 
further signal to apartheid officials that the former Governor of Georgia was willing to 
take substantive steps towards racial progress. Andrew Young, US ambassador to the 
UN, criticized the African-bloc demands to repeal South African membership as a 
“propaganda weapon,” that would not foster social change in Pretoria.134 Young’s 
verbose call for UN action while offering realistic solutions in private business 
encouragement to challenge apartheid was not unique to the rest of Carter’s 
administration. 
 Vice President Walter Mondale, similar to Henry Kissinger under President Ford, 
was the key in communicating Carter’s push for peace to Vorster while still maintaining 
stable transitions in Rhodesia and ending occupation in Namibia. In a May 1977 meeting, 
Mondale reminded Vorster of the US’ own struggle with equality which informed the 
Carter belief that full and successful democracy is only possible with full participation.135 
Mondale and Vorster further debate this American notion of equality while struggling to 
encompass South African cultural diversity to which Pretoria leadership articulates the 
idea that they, the Afrikaners, had vastly improved economic opportunities for Indians 
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and Blacks in South Africa compared to the previous British controlled regime.136  
Mondale proposed several policy plans regarding South Africa each with a focus on 
international cooperation through the UN. Mondale utilized the international organization 
to maintain frank US hegemony over Southern Africa by ensuring a strong US stance 
against apartheid while placating the apartheid ally during the regime turmoil in 
Rhodesia.137 
 This duality in the relationship was obvious early in the Carter administration 
when cabinet members discussed how to handle Rhodesia and concurrently advocate for 
human rights shifts in Pretoria. In countering Kissinger’s more permitting attitude with 
Vorster, National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski called for an end of illusion 
building policy and more overt demands for change.138 This shift came when discussing 
potentially breaking from European allies on UN resolutions on South African sanctions 
arose in pair with growing African bloc demands.139 These demands ranged from full 
mandatory embargoes advocacy to pursue a new international economic order.140 The 
truth of the Rhodesia matter came when it proved hypocritical of a human rights 
espousing Carter administration was urged majority rule in Rhodesia while working with 
the apartheid regime as noted by UN Ambassador Donald McHenry.141 This 
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interconnected problem of UN recourse for change were externalized in tense 
conversations between Carter officials and Pretoria leaders.  
Brzezinski reminded Botha, while discussing the role of the US in Rhodesia, that 
the demands for majority rule by black South Africans were legitimate and the growing 
need change social conditions in South Africa meant the US had to sustain the 
fundamental stance of Carter’s administration.142 This staunch perspective in Carter’s 
cabinet, however, would hinder any serious US-led change inside South Africa. Though 
not the immediate focus of this chapter, it is important to regard the shortcomings of 
Carter’s promising administration post-Soweto. Further echoing Alex Thomson’s work 
explored in Chapter One, Carter’s demands transformed into a stalemate in diplomacy. 
This stalemate was foreshadowed immediately in the early days of the administration 
when, in that same January conversation with Brzezinski, Botha stated, “In South Africa 
we have never shared power.”143  
The Soweto Uprising was a missed opportunity for the Ford administration and 
the further hinderance of diplomacy of Carter. Ford was intent on allowing open 
discussion between Kissinger and apartheid and Carter’s hard rhetoric would proactive a 
cold shoulder from Pretoria when asked to change its ways. While the apartheid 
government continued to ignore the demands for revisions, it would not be Ford or 
Kissinger that lead with rhetoric for change. That was seen clearly when Kissinger 
explained the Uprising as a moment when rioters were killed again by apartheid police 
rather than noting the overwhelming number of schoolchildren amongst the dead. Carter, 
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however, proved no better when unable to converse with South Africa without making 
them defensive of their apartheid policy as a way to maintain power in their state. These 
two extremes did not mirror the US reaction to Sharpeville exactly as Kennedy’s rhetoric 
paled in comparison to Carter’s and Eisenhower’s conflictual cabinet lacked the 
messaging tactics that Kissinger had monopolized. Nonetheless, while the US appeared 
stronger in the UN, with progressive ambassadors like Young and McHenry in 
supporting the anti-apartheid forces, Carter’s regime did not bring the end of apartheid 
nor the further empowerment of local anti-apartheid groups. Change in South Africa 
would come not from the official channels of US diplomacy, even into the 1980’s with 
more conservative policies of subtle economic appeasement like Reagan’s constructive 
engagement.   
Chapter 4: Living in “a World of Extraordinary Change:” Conclusions 
  Apartheid as a concept, practice, and government juxtaposed the US position 
during the Cold War as an enemy of the USSR and an ally of a human rights oppressive 
state. The Sharpeville Massacre of March 21, 1960 demonstrated an inconsistency in US 
foreign policy within the Eisenhower administration while President Kennedy’s half 
promises failed to reconcile Cold War practices with human rights rhetoric. South Africa, 
with its vital minerals to US nuclear proliferation and economic advantages, was never 
truly criticized under President Eisenhower even as the US civil rights movement was 
beginning to gain international attention. Kennedy’s inability to generate holistic 
sanctions against apartheid meant that the Cold War alliance was maintained while 
appearing progressive.  
  
 
 
 In maintaining the Cold War relationship, the years after Sharpeville gave rise to 
further state oppression in South Africa which reached another fever pitch in 1976 with 
the Soweto Uprising. Countering Eisenhower with a clear consensus of governance led 
by President Ford and Henry Kissinger, the US remained a public supporter of strong 
allies in tumultuous negotiation and subtle criticizer of apartheid. President Carter, 
though weak in delivery, vastly outweighed Kennedy’s rhetoric through direct challenges 
in the UN and in official meetings with apartheid officials.  
 Soweto posed the international world with the question of whether black students 
were unquailed rioters and if so, were apartheid local and national officials justified in the 
state of emergency implementation attempts to seize control over the townships. While 
Sharpeville involved mostly working-class adults, the primary victims in Soweto 
presented a critical injunction for the US as apartheid officials could not hide behind the 
bullet ridden bodies of schoolchildren. Kissinger ensured a temporary appeasement of the 
international community through his continued meeting with Botha and Vorster with 
detailed talks on the optics of these meetings. President Carter and his officials were in 
stark contrast in President Ford. While Kissinger alluded to the eventual decline of 
apartheid with Vorster, Brzezinski told Botha to accept the, “world of extraordinary 
change,” where apartheid-US relations were no longer possible, even while South Africa 
was playing a key role in regional negotiations.144 The chance at this change was not 
achieved under Carter.  
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 While the discussion of the fall of apartheid is not central to this paper, it is 
important to note the moments where the decline could have started. In the case of March 
21, 1960 and June 16, 1976, both Sharpeville and Soweto had the potential to 
unequivocally challenge apartheid as a form of governance and promote governmental 
reform. But neither happened. Instead, the precipitation of oppression through wide 
sweeping criminal acts, further inclusion of Cold War alliances, and stifling of the 
African bloc in international organizations ensured that a system of oppression, that the 
US denounced, would thrive.   
The apartheid was able to hide its acts of genocide through international 
legitimization and US backing. In the age of the Cold War, the enemy was never the 
capitalist friend in Pretoria but the Soviet Union and as such, apartheid was able to 
masquerade, to borrow from Oliver Tambo’s phrasing in the beginning, its human rights 
abuses as a sovereign state. This does not necessarily mean that the Sharpeville Massacre 
and the Soweto Uprising were simply tragic events. Rather each served as US foreign 
policy reflection points that exposed inconsistencies, superfluous rhetoric, and corrupt, 
albeit advantageous, partnerships to the US and international public to debate and push 
towards more progressive changes that would succeed Cold War politics.  
 
  
Bibliography 
Primary Sources 
Action Youth. “Sharpeville Day.” Arise Vukani 2, no. 3: 1987. Digital Innovation South 
Africa.   
  
 
 
Associated Press. “50 killed in South Africa as Police Fire on Rioters.” The New York 
Times, March 22, 1960. 
Associated Press. “South Africa Replies.” The New York Times, March 26, 1960.  
Associated Press. “South African Premier is Wounded by White Assassin at Fair in 
Johannesburg.” The New York Times, April 13, 1960. 
Associated Press, “Text of Vorster Statement,” The New York Times, June 19, 1976. 
Burns, John F. “South Africa Toll Rises to 58 Dead; Nearly 800 Hurt.” The New York 
Times, June 18, 1976. 
Burns, John F. “6 Die in South Africa Riot After Black Student Protest.” The New York 
Times, June 17, 1976. 
Biko, Steve. “Black Consciousness and the Quest for a True Humanity.” Humanity 4, no. 
1: 1972. Digital Innovation South Africa.  
Biko, Steve. “I Write What I Like: We Blacks,” SASO Newsletter, 1969. Digital 
Innovation South Africa. 
“Briefing Paper for Senator Kennedy, by Professor Fred Burke.” Papers of Papers of 
John F. Kennedy. Pre-Presidential Papers. Presidential Campaign Files, 1960. 
John F. Kennedy Presidential Library. 
Carter, Jimmy. “Interview with the President Question-and-Answer Session with a Group 
of Publishers, Editors, and Broadcasters.” April 15, 1977, The American 
Presidency Project 
“Comments upon the NBC staff memo of July 25 re South African uranium.” William 
Brubeck Personal Files, Box 387 A, South Africa Uranium. John F. Kennedy 
Presidential Library. 
  
 
 
Director of Central Intelligence Agency. Special Intelligence Estimate: Short-Term 
Prospects for South Africa. Central Intelligence Agency. July 19, 1960. 
Episcopal Churchmen for South Africa. “The Pretoria Thirteen,” May 1975, Digital 
Innovation South Africa. 
http://africanactivist.msu.edu/document_metadata.php?objectid=32-130-1C11 
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, Volume XIV, Africa. (Washington: 
Government Printing Office). Document 344. 
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, Volume XIV, Africa. (Washington: 
Government Printing Office). Document 345. 
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, Volume XIV, Africa. (Washington: 
Government Printing Office). Document 353. 
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, Volume XIV, Africa. (Washington: 
Government Printing Office). Document 347. 
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume XVI, Southern Africa. 
(Washington: Government Printing Office). Document 261. 
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume XVI, Southern Africa. 
(Washington: Government Printing Office). Document 264. 
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume XVI, Southern Africa. 
(Washington: Government Printing Office). Document 265. 
Government of the Union of South Africa, “Internal Security Act No. 79.” Apartheid 
Legislation 1948-1990 Collection, O’Malley Archive.  
Government of the Union of South Africa. “Suppression of Communism Act, 1951.” 
Apartheid Legislation 1948-1990 Collection, O’Malley Archives.  
  
 
 
Government of the Union of South Africa. “Unlawful Organizations Act No. 24.” 
Apartheid Legislation 1948-1990 Collection, O’Malley Archives.  
Government of the Union of South Africa. “Sabotage Act General Laws Amendment Act 
No. 76.” Apartheid Legislation 1948-1990 Collection, O’Malley Archives.  
Ingallsspecial, Leonard. “Republic is voted for South Africa; Verwoerd Victor; Record 
All-White Poll Backs Move to End Allegiance to the British Crown.” The New 
York Times, October 7, 1960  
Horrell, Muriel. A Survey on Race Relations in South Africa. South Africa: South African 
Institute of Race Relations, 1961. Digital Innovation South Africa.  
Hovey, Graham. “Conflict in U.N. is Doubted by Young.” The New York Times, January 
14, 1977. 
“Memorandum for the President from Vice President Mondale, April 21, 1977.” Walter 
F. Mondale Personal Papers, Minnesota Historical Society, Digital Collections. 
“Memorandum of Conversation between Kissinger and Botha, May 23, 1976.” National 
Security Council Memorandum of Conversation Collection, Gerald Ford 
Presidential Library, Digital Collections.   
“Memorandum of Conversation between Kissinger and Ford, June 17, 1976.” National 
Security Council Memorandum of Conversation Collection, Gerald Ford 
Presidential Library, Digital Collections.    
“Memorandum of Conversation between Kissinger and Vorster, June 23, 1976.” Box 20, 
Memorandums of Conversation, Gerald Ford Presidential Library, Digital 
Collections. 
  
 
 
“Memorandum of Conversation, Third Meeting between Vice President Mondale and 
Prime Minister Vorster, May 20, 1977.” Walter F. Mondale Personal Papers, 
Minnesota Historical Society, Digital Collections. 
“Memo to Dean Rusk from G. Mennen Williams, US Policy Towards South Africa, June 
1963.” William Brubeck Personal Files. Box 387, South Africa 3/63- 8/63. John 
F. Kennedy Presidential Library. 
“Memo to McGeorge Bundy from William Brubeck, October 29, 1963.” William 
Brubeck Personal Files. Box 387 A, South Africa 9/63- 11/63. John F. Kennedy 
Presidential Library. 
“Memo to the President from G. Mennen Williams, n.d.” William Brubeck Personal 
Files. Box 387 A, South Africa Uranium. John F. Kennedy Presidential Library. 
“National Security Council Meeting Minutes, April 7, 1976.” Box 2, Gerald Ford 
Presidential Library, Digital Collections.    
“National Strategy Series: South Africa, October 28, 1963.” National Security Files. 
Countries, South Africa, General, National Security Strategy Series “South 
Africa” 10/28/63 Box 159A, National Strategy Series. John F. Kennedy 
Presidential Library. 
“Note from Myer Feldman to Dean Rusk, September 23, 1963.” William Brubeck 
Personal Files. Box 387 A, South Africa Uranium. John F. Kennedy Presidential 
Library. 
Oliver Tambo interview with E.S. Reddy. March 1, 1977, 
https://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/interview-oliver-tambo-luanda-after-
summit-meeting-presidents-frontline-states-and-southern. 
  
 
 
“Possible South African Reactions to Proposals to Cancel or Alter the US Uranium 
Purchase Contract.” William Brubeck Personal Files. Box 387 A, South Africa 
Uranium. John F. Kennedy Presidential Library 
Reeves, Ambrose. Commission of Enquiry into the Occurrences at Sharpeville (and other 
places) on the 21st March, 1960. University of California Los Angeles, 
International Digital Ephemera Project. 
“Remarks of Senator John F Kennedy, March 26, 1960.” Papers of Papers of John F. 
Kennedy. Pre-Presidential Papers. Presidential Campaign Files, 1960. John F. 
Kennedy Presidential Library. 
Republic of South Africa. “Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Riots at Soweto 
and Elsewhere from the 16th of June 1976 to the 28th of February 1977.” 
Northwestern University Libraries. 
 “Strategy at the 18th General Assembly, Sept 9, 1963.” William Brubeck Personal Files. 
Box 387 A, South Africa 9/63-11/63. John F. Kennedy Presidential Library. 
Tebello Motapanyane. “How June 16 demo was planned.” Interview by South African 
Students Movement.  Digital Imaging South Africa, January 1977. 
“Telcon Record between the President and George Ball, July 16, 1963.” The Personal 
Papers of George W. Ball. Box 7, South Africa 7/27/61-10/31/63. John F. 
Kennedy Presidential Library. 
Teltsch, Kathleen. “South Africa is Suspended by UN Assembly, 91-22.” The New York 
Times, Nov 13, 1974. 
  
 
 
“The Department of State Bulletin, Vol. LXXV, No. 1933, 59-60, July 12, 1976.” 
Department of State Bulletins Collections, Gerald Ford Presidential Library, 
Digital Collections. 
The New African Magazine. “Communism Come-back?” August 1962. Digital 
Innovation South Africa. 
Tom, Petrus. “Sharpeville: March 21, 1960.” Worker News no. 40 (1980). Federation of 
South African Trade Unions. 
“UN Policy for the Next Security Council Meeting on South Africa, October 1963.” 
William Brubeck Personal Files. Box 387, Security Council 10/63-11/63. John F. 
Kennedy Presidential Library. 
Wessels, P. J. Report on the Commission Appointed to Investigate and Report on the 
Occurrences in the Districts of Vereeniging (Namely, at Sharpeville Location and 
Evaton), and Vanderbijlpark, Province of the Transvaal, on 21st March 1960, 
April 13, 1960. Special Book Collection, University of South Africa Institutional 
Repository.  
Secondary Sources 
Baldwin, Lewis V. Toward the Beloved Country: Martin Luther King, Jr. and South 
Africa. Cleveland: Pilgrim Press, 1995. 
Borstelmann, Thomas. The Cold War and the Color Line: American Race Relations in 
the Global Arena. Harvard: Harvard University Press, 2001.  
Brown, Julian. The Road to Soweto: Resistance and the Uprising of 16 June 1976. USA: 
Boydell & Brewer, 2016. 
  
 
 
Cherry, Janet. Spear of the Nation (Umkhonto weSizewe): South Africa’s Liberation 
Army: 1960’s-1990’s. USA: Ohio University Press, 2011. 
Christenson, Ron. Political Trials in History: From Antiquity to the Present, 1st ed. USA: 
Transaction Publishers, 1991. 
Dubow, Saul. “Racial Irredentism, Ethnogenesis, and White Supremacy in High-
Apartheid South Africa.” Kronos 41 (2015): 236-264. 
Fraser, Cary. “Crossing the Color Line in Little Rock: The Eisenhower Administration 
and the Dilemma of Race for US Foreign Policy,” Diplomatic History 24, no. 4 
(2000): 233-264. 
Gaddis, John Lewis. The Cold War: A New History. USA: Penguin Books, 2005. 
Grant, Nicholas. Winning Our Freedom Together: African Americans and Apartheid, 
1945-1960. USA: University of North Carolina Press, 2017. 
Gurney, Christabel. “The 1970s: The Anti-Apartheid Movement’s Difficult Decade.” 
Journal of Southern African Studies 35 (2009): 471-487. 
Hirson, Baruch. Year of Fire, Year of Ash: The Soweto Revolt-Roots of a Revolutions? 
London: Zed Books Ltd., 2016. 
Hyman, Zoe. “’To have its cake and eat it too:’ US policy toward South Africa during the 
Kennedy administration,” The Sixties: A Journal of History, Politics and Culture 
8, no. 2 (2015), 138-155. 
Irwin, Ryan. Gordian Knot: Apartheid and the Unmaking of the Liberal World Order. 
New York: Oxford University Press, 2012. 
Landau, Paul S. “The ANC, MK, and ‘The Turn to Violence’ (1960-1962),” South 
African Journal of History 64, no. 3: 538-563. 
  
 
 
Lodge, Tom. Sharpeville: An Apartheid Massacre and its Consequences.  New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2011.  
Massie, Robert Kinloch. Loosing the Bonds: The United States and South Africa in the 
Apartheid Years. New York: Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, 1997. 
Macqueen, Ian. “Students, Apartheid, and the Ecumenial Movement in South Africa, 
1960-1975,” Journal of Southern African Studies 39, no. 2 (2013): 447-463.  
Nesbitt, Francis Njubi. Race for Sanctions: African Americans Against Apartheid, 1946-
1994. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004. 
Noer, Thomas J. Cold War and Black Liberation: The United States and White Rule in 
Africa 1948-1968. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1985.  
Stevens, Simon. “Boycotts and Sanctions against South Africa: An International History, 
1946-1970.” PhD diss., Columbia University, New York City, 2016. Columbia 
University Academic Commons.  
Thakur, Vineet. “Foreign Policy and its People: Transforming the Apartheid Department 
of Foreign Affairs,” Diplomacy & Statecraft 26 (2015): 514-533. 
Thomson, Alex. “The Diplomacy of Impasse: The Carter Administration and Apartheid 
South Africa,” Diplomacy & Statecraft, 21 (2010): 107-124. 
Van Wyk, Martha S. “Ally or Critic? The United States’ Response to South African 
Nuclear Development, 1949-1980,” Cold War History 7, no. 2 (2007): 195- 225. 
Vinson, Robert Trent. “Albert Luthuli’s Private Struggle: How an Icon of Peace Came to 
Accept Sabotage in South Africa,” Journal of African History 59, no. 1 (2018): 
69-96 
  
 
 
Welsh, David. The Rise and Fall of Apartheid. Jeppestown: Jonathan Ball Publishers, 
Ltd, 2009. 
White, George. Holding the Line: Race, Racism, and American Foreign Policy Towards 
Africa, 1953-1961. USA: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2005. 
 
